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Regulation, in Larry Lessig's famous insight, comes not just from
laws, but also from norms, from the market, and from the architecture of
the world. This is true in cyberspace and in real space. Take, for example,
the very topical issue of the regulation of the copying of digital works. We
know that these works can be protected by civil copyright law, but they can
also be protected--or at least the RIAA has tried to protect them'-by the
propagation of the norm that file sharing is actually stealing. As another
example, every time a film or movie is released, it can be protected through
various means in the market, for example, by simultaneous rather than
staggered releases in different geographical markets. But crucially as a
digital object, it can also be protected by the architecture of the cyberspace
world. That is by using "code" such as digital rights management (DRM).
When I use the term "code," I mean not just program code (i.e. lines
of code C++ or the like), but also the physical environment of cyberspace
or, in other words, the entire architecture composed of the software, the
hardware, the wires, the devices attached by wires, and even "offline
world" devices attached by wireless internet, which include RIFD chips, 2
for example.
I. ARCHITECTURES
In Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace, Larry Lessig demonstrates
how cyberspace is governed by the interaction of the four regulating forces
* Lilian Edwards is Professor of Internet Law at the University of Sheffield. She can be reached
at lilian.edwards@sheffield.ac.uk.
1. See, e.g., Recording Industry Association of America, RIAA Pre-Lawsuit Letters Go To 22
Campuses In New Wave of Deterrence Program, http://www.riaa.com/newsitem.php?id=8E8AE3ID-
2CD9-5E90-8892-5FEBD3A603B9 (last visited Dec. 6, 2009). For a discussion of the recording indus-
try and their lawsuits relating to digital music filesharing, see, for example, Ryan Bates, Comment,
Communication Breakdown: The Recording Industry's Pursuit of the Individual Music User, a Compar-
ison of U.S. and E.U. Copyright Protections for Internet Music File Sharing, 25 NW. J. INT'L L. & Bus.
229 (2004).
2. For more information on RFID chips and their uses, see Scott Granneman, RFID Chips Are
Here, SECURITY Focus, June 26, 2003, http://www.securityfocus.concolumnists/i69.
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I have identified-architecture, law, market, and norms. 3 Let us start with
Lessig's famous statement that, in cyberspace, architecture or "code" regu-
lates like legal code. 4 In the real world, architecture is a given. For exam-
ple, we do not need legislation forbidding humans from flying in built up
areas because gravity regulates that already, and gravity is a naturally oc-
curring architecture in the real world. Cyberspace is different in that the
architecture has been built from scratch by deliberate design decisions.
Someone has designed it, someone wrote it, and someone owns it. That is
the crucial point, despite it being fairly obvious. What is less obvious is the
idea that this "code" is not designed with the constraints that are normally
applied to legal codes, such as attention to the impact on fundamental hu-
man rights.
A. The Democratic Deficit
Code is not made by elected democratic representatives, and it is not
subject to constitutional control. It is not subject, for example, to human
rights control, such as the European Convention on Human Rights that we
are familiar with in the UK and the EU. It is not subject to any of the Con-
stitutional Amendments. So, we have what I call the "democratic deficit" of
code, which can lead us to the idea that rather than living in a world regu-
lated by elected governments, we might be living online in the "Microsoft
world" or even the "open-source world."
Although many "real world" laws apply, of course, to cyberspace
activities, the meat of this insight is that cyberspace is also regulated by
coders and not exclusively, or even primarily, by law. What Lessig does
not quite say-though you can argue that it is there between the lines-is
that code is superior to law as a means of effective regulation. 5 I however
will say it: code (often, though not always) trumps law.
B. How Code Trumps Law
What I find in my own research increasingly is that whatever legal
problems or technology problems our laws attempt to regulate, code is
more effective at achieving the aim of the regulation. Take again the exam-
ple of digital copying. While the law has been almost completely ineffec-
3. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (ver. 2.0, 2006). For addi-
tional discussion of these distinctions, see Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL
STUD. 661, 662-63 (1998).
4. See LESSIG, CODE, supra note 3, at 5.
5. See id. at 120-37.
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tive in preventing digital copying,6 Digital Rights Management (DRM)
code is very effective. 7 An arms race may of course develop of code vs.
code-as has been the case with DRM algorithms and widely publicized
technical hacks developed to circumvent them. More recently, DRM has
fallen out of favour due to a consumer backlash against it, but a new "code"
solution--disconnecting the Internet accounts of alleged downloaders at
the request of the music industry-has become popular with lobbyists for
the content industry and adopted into the laws of both the UK (the Digital
economy Act of 2010) and France ("HADOPI").
Similarly, there has been a large amount of anti-spain laws passed at
the state and federal levels 8 in the U.S., and there have been EC Directives
and local laws passed on privacy, data protection and spam control in the
E.U. 9 None of these laws have had a meaningful effect on preventing the
flow and dissemination of spam and the percentage of email that is spam
continues to rise.10 However, Spam filters-a "code" solution-make my
inbox a happy place. I am no longer troubled by spam (though, it has to be
said, my ISP still is) because I have Spam Assassin,I and that solves the
6. See Zachary Williams, Note, Hometaping In the Twenty-First Century: Updating the Audio
Home Recording Act to Address Emerging Technologies, 36 AIPLA Q.J. 77, 81-82 (2008).
7. Digital rights management is defined as a code-based method for authorizing the viewing or
playback of copyrighted material on a user owned machine. See, e.g., ZDNet, DRM: Definition,
http://dictionary.zdnet.com/definition/DRM.html (last visited Dec. 27, 2009). For a discussion of digital
rights management, see, for example, Stefan Bechtold, Digital Rights Management in the United States
and Europe, 52 AM. J. CoMP. L. 323 (2004) (arguing statutory limitations to the different means of
DRM protection seem necessary); Dan L. Burk, Legal and Technical Standards in Digital Rights
Management Technologies, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 537 (2005) (examining the social costs of deploying
digital rights management systems to protect copyrighted content); Julie E. Cohen, DRM and Privacy,
18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 575 (2003) (arguing that with some adjustments, DRM technologies could be
harnessed to protect privacy).
8. The primary statute in the United States addressing spam is the CAN-SPAM Act, Controlling
the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography And Marketing, 15 U.S.C. § 7701 (2006). For a discussion of
CAN-SPAM, see, for example, Scot M. Graydon, Much Ado About SPAM: Unsolicited Advertising, the
Internet, and You, 32 ST. MARY'S L.J. 77 (2000) (arguing federal legislation is needed to harmonize
state level spain regulation); Elizabeth Phillips Marsh, Purveyors of Hate on the Internet: Are We Ready
for Hate Spain?, 17 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 379 (2000) (arguing that in the absence of governmental regula-
tion of privacy data, criminal law should be able to reach hate spam if it encourages violence to an
intolerable degree); Gary Miller, How to Can Spain: Legislating Unsolicited Commercial E-Mail, 2
VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 127 (2000) (arguing that advertisers should be required to obtain permission
before they send advertisements through an Internet service provider's system).
9. For discussion of EU approaches to spam, see, generally, LILIAN EDWARDS, LAW AND THE
INTERNET, ch. 15 (Edwards, L. & Waelde C., eds., 3d. ed. 2010).
10. See Taiwo A. Oriola, Regulating Unsolicited Commercial Electronic Mail in the United States
and the European Union: Challenges and Prospects, 7 TuL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 113 (2005);
Jeffrey D. Sullivan & Michael B. De Leeuw, Spare After CAN-SPAM: How Inconsistent Thinking Has
Made a Hash Out of Unsolicited Commercial Email Policy, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH
TECH. L.J. 887 (2004).
11. Spam Assassin is an open source spam filter. Spam Assassin, http://spamassassin.apache.org/
(last visited Jan. 27, 2009).
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problem for me. So, again, code trumps law.
II. CODE AND PRIVACY
If you go back to look at the original version of Code and Other Laws
of Cyberspace, the privacy chapter1 2 was quite evasive and very pessimis-
tic. It implied that code had to be inherently invasive of privacy. 13 Lessig
gave examples such as surveillance by cameras, websites we visit, and
data-collection companies and the subsequent mining of the data col-
lected. 14 Lessig's preferred solution to the anti-privacy regulatory bias of
code at the time was a "privacy enhancing technology" (PET), namely P3P,
the platform for privacy preferences. 15 The underlying idea of P3P was that
users would basically go out into the electronic world and bargain at arms'
length about what data they wanted to give away and at what price they
were willing to do so for every data-collecting website. 16 The trouble with
P3P was that consumers, lacking education or intuition about the risks of
disseminating their personal data, had no incentive to spend this time on
bargaining and even more importantly, the market had little or no incentive
to pay or negotiate for data that they had previously collected for free. The
model though, simply did not succeed. Although P3P was incorporated into
Internet Explorer and other browsers, 17 it has been largely ignored by the
public and the market. No meaningful marketplace of choices among more
or less privacy friendly websites evolved for the consumer. So Lessig
picked the wrong solution. But does this mean that code in cyberspace
always has to be inherently anti-privacy? This writer would disagree with
that assessment.
My approach to code, law, and privacy starts with the idea of technol-
ogy neutrality, that is, the presumption that code is not necessarily invasive
of privacy. It is not inevitable that any increase in the amount of code on
the Internet will lead to an accompanying decline in the amount of privacy
on the Internet, even though this is the impression you might sometimes
derive from looking at the website of the EFF, 18 EPIC,' 9 the Berkman Cen-
12. LESSIG, CODE, supra note 3, at 200-32.
13. See id. at 202-03.
14. Id. at 203-04,215-16.
15. Id. at 228.
16. Id. at 226.
17. See, e.g., Microsoft Corporation, Use Internet Explorer 6 to Help Safeguard Your Privacy on
the Web, http://www.microsoft.com/windows/ie/ie6/using/howto/privacy/config.mspx (last visited Jan.
27, 2009).
18. Electronic Frontier Foundation, http://www.eff.org/ (last visited Dec. 27, 2009).
19. Electronic Privacy Information Center, http://epic.org/ (last visited Dec. 27, 2009).
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ter,20 Privacy International and FIPR, and the like. However the correct
incentives have to be in place for the owners and writers of code to priorit-
ize privacy. Merely bolting on a specific privacy-enhancing technology
tool-like P3P-after the fact, to a system based around largely privacy-
invasive code and anti-privacy values is unlikely to work. A better solution
is to design code to promote privacy as a core value to start with-the idea
of "privacy by design." The question then is how do we make corporations
that write and install code consider privacy as a plus and not a minus in
their software development cycle to start with?
The first insight is that code, like other technologies, is to begin with,
a value-neutral tool. It is, however, then imbued with the values of those
who own it and those who write it. These are not necessarily the same per-
sons. A seemingly infinite number of coders work for Microsoft, but the
values imbued into the code are almost certainly connected to what makes
profits for Microsoft-or perhaps Bill Gates' ideas of Microsoft's core
business mission-rather than these coders' personal ethics. Thus if Micro-
soft makes money from collecting data about its users, then, barring regula-
tion, it has little incentive to design its code to be privacy-enhancing. This
is pretty much the status quo. I discuss below how to make privacy look
like part of a business model and less like a problem for a business depen-
dent on data collection.
It is worth noting that some argue that since code can be rewritten-
modified or hacked-the values of the original "owners" are not crucial
and code always remains "value-neutral." However the average consumer
or user-people like my mother-does not know how to code. Average
consumers do not know how to encrypt their email, for example, or their
P2P traffic. 21 They do not know how to protect themselves against private
or public electronic surveillance or how to "kill" RFID chips by putting
them in a microwave. These people do not have the power generally to
tweak code to their own end. Thus, the values of the original writers and
packagers of code remain crucial.
A. Anti-Privacy and Pro-Privacy Code
In this section, we will look at some examples of pro and anti-privacy
code, drawn from the EU experience, and then in the next section, try to
work through what incentivized the use of privacy-enhancing or privacy-
20. Berkman Center for Internet & Society, http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/ (last visited Dec. 27,
2009).




"Code," in the metaphorical sense I am using, occurs in the offline
and online world. In the offline world, a good example is closed-circuit
television cameras (CCTV) which are ubiquitous in the UK.22 When I walk
out of my office, there are cameras in the halls, cameras outside the doors,
cameras in the street, cameras in front of stores, cameras at the airport, and
so forth. Ostensibly, these cameras are there for preventing or detecting
crime, and this enables them to ignore the terms of almost all of the con-
trols required under UK data protection (DP) law.
Another example of anti-privacy code in the offline world relates to
RFID tags. We are seeing increasing use of RFID in the commercial private
sector as inventory aids and anti-shop lifting devices, 23 and they are also
increasingly used to track and monitor users via the likes of biometric
passports, school and library books and transport smartcards.24 RFID chips
allow recording of what users do in the real world and especially tracking
where they go, such as what transport routes they take. This "bugging"
quality facilitates surveillance and data mining which is often seen as an
extreme invasion of privacy.25
An online example of what I refer to as anti-privacy code includes
Gmail,26 Google's free email service that scans all of your outgoing and
your incoming emails for targetd advertising purposes. 27 At the time Gmail
was launched, there was something of an outcry from privacy groups. 28 Not
only is the privacy of the holder of the Gmail account impacted, but so to is
the privacy of everyone the holder emails or receives emails. Thus, even if
you consented to trading your privacy for the nice free email service, if you
care about the privacy of your friends, you may hesitate to use Gmail.
Another online example is what Sony BMG did when they covertly in-
stalled a rootkit into user computers via code installed when those users
22. For a discussion of CCTV and its prevalence in the UK, see, for example, Robert D. Bickel,
Susan Brinkley & Wendy White, Seeing Past Privacy: Will the Development and Application of CCTV
and Other Video Security Technology Compromise an Essential Constitutional Right in a Democracy,
or Will the Courts Strike a Proper Balance?, 33 STETSON L. REv. 299, 345 (2003).
23. Gal Eschet, FIPs and PETs for RFID: Protecting Privacy in the Web of Radio Frequency
Identification, 45 JURIMETRICS J. 301, 309 (2005).
24. Anne Broache, RFID Passports Arrive for Americans, CNET NEWS, Aug. 14, 2006,
http://news.cnet.com/RFID-passports-arrive-for-Americans/2100-1028_3-6105534.html.
25. See EDWARDS, supra note 9, at ch. 16.
26. Gmail: Email from Google, http://mail.google.com (last visited Dec. 27, 2009).
27. About Gmail, http://mail.google.commail/help/about-privacy.html (last visited Dec. 27,
2009).
28. See EDWARDS, supra note 9, at ch. 16; see also Hiawatha Bray, Where are You Now?,




bought Sony-manufactured CDs. Sony was pursuing the legitimate and
crucial goal of trying to prevent its wares from being copied and shared in
defiance of license conditions, but it used what has been described by some
as an illicit method to reach this goal.29 Normally, installing harmful
rootkits and spyware without user notice and consent is regarded as a form
of illegal computer hacking and/or actionable civil tort in most jurisdic-
tions, regardless of the goal.
30
Examples of pro-privacy code, outside the rather isolated village of
specific PETS, include certain social networking sites (SNSs) or "blog"
sites, like Live Journal, 31 that promote privacy as part of the service they
supply. This idea is now mainstreamed (for example, it is in use on Face-
book), but back in 2002, when Live Journal pioneered it, it was fairly un-
common. Live Journal's code allows a user to set up "friend lists" and
make blog posts visible only by friends, or subsets of those friends.
"Friends" here means people to whom you are prepared to make disclosure,
people whom you trust, or people you are prepared to let into your private
life. So I can use Live Journal to make posts that are public, meaning that
everyone in the world can see them. I can also make what is called a
"friends-only" post, whereby I can post information about my love life,
medical condition, work place, and other personal details without making
the post available to the entire world. These posts will only be readable by
people that I put on my friends list. I can also create custom friends groups
to control which friends receive certain information. You could have a
custom friends group that you want to know about your love life, and it
could be different than the group you wanted to know about your work or
the group you wanted to know about your medical condition. Furthermore,
there is a box you can check when you set up your Live Journal account to
request that it not be searchable, 32 and then, no one can find you through
Google or other search engines. This system is about trust building and
community building, but it is also very sophisticated in allowing you the
user to imbue the technology of the system with your own tailored privacy
values. Over the last few years, despite the fact that social networking may
seem inherently about seeking publicity, the ability to make friends-only
posts has become a norm in the social networking world on multi-million
user sites like Facebook and Twitter, as well as more minor hobbyist sites
29. See generally, Deirdre K. Mulligan & Aaron K. Perzanowski, The Magnificence of the Disas-
ter: Reconstructing the Sony BMG Rootkit Incident, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1157 (2007).
30. Seeid. at 1166-69.
31. Live Journal, http://livejoumal.com (last visited Dec. 27, 2009).
32. A spider is a program that searches for information on the web by "crawling" websites.
ZDNet, Spider: Definition, http://dictionary.zdnet.com/index.php?d=spider (last visited Dec. 27, 2009).
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such as Live Journal. This phenomena has proved to be especially popular
with older or more risk-averse users, particularly perhaps those with "alter
egos," that is users with responsible public profiles who also have frivolous
hobbies or alternate sexual tastes.
Another mainstream example of pro-privacy code relates yet again to
spain. Spam, as I have previously stated, is a big problem. Pro-privacy code
for guaranteeing your privacy and security against spare has been devel-
oped, and we now have very effective spam filtering. 33 My own spam filter
system now has few false negatives, and only a few false positives. Again,
we have seen a lot of coordinated private sector effort in this area. We had
the anti-spam alliance with AOL, Microsoft, Yahoo, and Earthlink trying to
work together to create an entrusted email system. 34 The IETF is working
in this area as well. 35 Eventually, we should see some kind of trusted email,
identified-sender system that effectively controls spam (since any email
that disguises its origins can presumptively be discarded as likely to be
spain).
We go back to that very simplistic idea discussed at the beginning of
33. See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, EMAIL ADDRESS HARVESTING AND THE EFFECTIVENESS
OF ANTI-SPAM FILTERS 5-6 (2005), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2005/l l/spamharvest.pdf.
34. See David Dickinson, Note, An Architecture for Spam Regulation, 57 FED. COMM. L.J. 129,
145 (2005).
35. Two primary proposals were proffered to IETF for authenticating senders and limiting domain
name spoofing and repudiation of spam: Sender ID and DomainKeys. SenderlD was a proposal offered
by Microsoft to authenticate the identities of senders of email and, thereby ostensibly, mitigate the span
problem. See Microsoft Corporation, SenderlD Home Page, http://www.microsoft.com/ mscorp/safety/
technologies/senderid/default.mspx (last visited Dec. 27, 2009). Based on the sender's server IP ad-
dress, SenderlD was intended to eliminate domain name spoofing by preventing repudiation of email
and holding ISPs accountable for span sent through their services by confirming that each email mes-
sage originated from the Internet domain it claimed. Consequently, recipients could seamlessly reject
messages that claimed to be from an IP address that had not been declared by the alleged sender. See
Brian Livingston, Sender ID Declines, DomainKeys Shines, DATAMATION, Sept. 28, 2004,
http://itmanagement.earthweb.com/columns/executive-tech/article.php/3413611. Several critiques of
SenderlD were raised, including the fundamental incompatibility of its license terms with those of
open-source products and a question regarding Microsoft patents of key SenderlD technology, leading
AOL, for example, to lose faith in the project. Id.; see also Sender ID Loses Supporters, ZDNET, Sept.
03, 2004, http://news.zdnet.co.uk/internet/security/0,39020375,39165420,00.htm. Currently the propos-
al appears to be fatally stalled in the IETF. DomainKeys, the proposal of Yahoo! and Sendmail, was
termed a "cryptographic authentication solution" to the problem of phishing since it uses public-key
cryptography to let users verify that a message actually comes from the domain that is listed in the
sending address. See Yahoo! Media Relations, Sendmail and Yahoo! Collaborate to Develop and
Deploy DomainKeys, http://docs.yahoo.com/docs/pr/releasel143.html (last visited Dec. 27, 2009).
Each ISP or email provider that implements the system has a private key that it uses to sign all outgoing
messages and publishes its public key in the Domain Name System records. In this manner, Domain-
Keys would also certify that the contents of the message have not been altered in transit. Because all
outgoing email servers would "sign" messages using a digital certificate, recipients could reject mes-
sages that did not comport with a listing in the World Wide Web registry. Although DomainKeys
received more positive responses in the IETF and public debate than SenderlD, the technology itself is
now in question. See, e.g., Dennis Fisher, Scammers Exploit DomainKeys Anti-phishing Weapon,
EWEEK, Nov. 29, 2004, http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,1759,1732 5 76,00.asp,
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this piece that code is written to reflect the values of its owners and its
writers. The owners and the writers of Microsoft, Yahoo!, AOL, for exam-
ple, do not in all likelihood care much about the privacy of their users.
However, Internet service providers (ISP) and host services, especially
providers of webmail, such as Microsoft Hotmail, care a great deal about
the congestion of the Internet because they spend a lot of time and money
throwing away 90% of the email that runs through their systems. 36 Hot-
mail, for example, cares a great deal about spain because it gives their ser-
vice a bad name and scares a very large number of users away. So these
groups are not worried about privacy out of the goodness of their hearts,
but the privacy of users is a spin-off of their concern for the financial sta-
bility of their enterprises.
The key question is why would owners and writers justify implement-
ing anti-privacy code over pro-privacy code? For example, with regard to
the Sony DRM rootkit,37 I have asked myself, "How could Sony be so
short-sighted?" And the straight answer appears to be that Sony was think-
ing about a primary economic goal of stopping IP infringement and not
about their end user's privacy, security or trust in Sony. Their file-sharing
concerns overwhelmed any concerns they had for the privacy or security of
their users or the public.
CCTV 38 is an interesting example of a situation where the public, not
just the code owners or writers, appear to favor anti-privacy code. There
were many surveys in the UK during the 2000s that asked people whether
they liked CCTV, and a high percentage of respondents usually said yes,
because the general perception in the UK is that CCTV is what protects
people from crime on the streets. 39 This is true despite empirical evidence,
which actually shows that CCTV mostly moves the crime to a different
area.40 Thus, the public in this case is in favor of the anti-privacy code.
41
36. Debin Liu, Recent Development, The Economics of Proof-of-Work, 3 US: J/L & POL'Y
INFORM. SOC'Y 337, 338 (2007).
37. For a discussion of the Sony rootkit, see generally Bruce Schneier, Real Story of the Rogue
Rootkit, WIRED, Nov. 17, 2005 http://www.wired.com/news/privacy/0, 1848,69601,00.html. US-CERT,
part of the US Department of Homeland Security advised consumers not to install software from an
audio CD. Two sets of Sony DRM were implicated: XCP and SunnComm's Media Max version 5. See,
e.g., Brian Krebs, Study of Sony Anti-Piracy Software Triggers Uproar, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 2005,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/1 1/02/AR2005 110202362.
html.
38. See sources cited supra note 22.
39. Duncan Carling, Note, Less Privacy Please, We're British: Investigating Crime with DNA in
the U.K. and the U.S., 31 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 487, 506 (2008).
40. See Lisa Minuk, Why Privacy Still Matters: The Case Against Prophylactic Video Surveil-
lance in For-Profit Long-Term Care Homes, 32 QUEEN'S L.J. 224, 265-66 (2007).
41. However, this has changed slightly even in the UK as we have moved into the second decade
of the 21 ' century and the public has been exposed to the reality of constant data breaches by the public
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So far, RFID has seen little debate within the general public. Whether
they will favour it as a security enhancing technology, such as allegedly
stopping terrorists from entering the country by use of biometric passports,
or whether there will be a privacy-conscious backlash as we saw with re-
spect to the UK ID card after extensive campaigning by groups like No To
ID,42 remains to be seen.
B. Why Privacy-Friendly Code Matters
So why do people write privacy-friendly code, as opposed to privacy-
invasive code? We have already briefly considered the above examples of
spain filters, which act to save ISPs and webmail providers money, as well
as to help build the brand and protect user privacy. Turning to the example
of Live Journal, we next ask why did they choose to write into their code
the capacity for users to protect their privacy via customizable friends
groups, when the normal belief is that any SNS not charging for services
will choose to collect as much data as possible from its users, and thus
encourage disclosure and discourage privacy-enhancing code as much as
possible?
Live Journal was, in conception, very much a grassroots, counter-
culture kind of project. It is open-source code, meaning that anyone can use
its source code to build their own blogging site (and this has happened, as
with, GreatestJournal and DeadJournal). Importantly, its code was written
by people who planned to use it themselves and to let others whom they
regarded as friends or at least allies, to build upon it.43 The early adopters
were both writers and users, and that is, I think, one reason why it was built
to be privacy enhancing. The people who wrote it valued their own privacy,
security, as well as their sense of community, and wrote those values into
the code. People do not necessarily sign-on to Live Journal because it
overtly advertizes having strong privacy values, but they are attracted to the
strong online community spirit, which is itself engendered by the fact that
users and groups, especially those from alternative communities (such as
Goths, gamers, alternate sexuality groups, BDSM groups, etc.) have tools
available to protect themselves from the external gaze while still being able
to network internally in quite complex ways. More customers thus amass,
sector.
42. See Elitsa Vucheva, EU to Launch Biometric Passports by Summer, EU OBSERVER, Jan. 14,
2009, http://euobserver.com/9/27407.
43. Note that Live Journal was however purchased by, Six Apart since the time this talk was
given. For a discussion of open-source software, see generally Max Henrion, Open-Source Policy
Modeling, 3 US: J.L. & POL'Y INFORM. Soc'Y 355, 357-58 (2007).
[Vol 84:3
CODING PRIVACY
which means more goodwill and a higher price when the enterprise is sold.
Thus, you can make privacy into a brand and a valuable feature (as was
seen when Live Journal was recently purchased by Six Apart, a company
previously specializing in social networking in the Russian market). Even
now Live Journal is owned by an enterprise distinct from its users, and its
clientele continue to police its privacy-enhancing features by making a fuss
whenever there are signs that Live Journal is departing from the established
community values, as was demonstrated when Live Journal decided to
introduce a limited degree of advertising as the "price" of a free account.
Live Journal constitutes an example of a company where privacy code was
built into the system from the beginning as "privacy by design" and where
such a function became part of its business model.
III. FINAL THOUGHTS
I have argued above that code neither inherently invades privacy nor
preserves privacy; instead, code reflects the values of its writers and own-
ers, and sometimes, where their views are crucial to economic success, its
users. Can we use this insight to produce better privacy for users? Consum-
ers will, experience shows, rarely lobby for privacy per se. In the UK, sur-
veys have shown that in the e-services market, consumers see privacy as
quite low on the list of buying features after things like price, accessibility,
availability and convenience. But, if you can tie it to something consumers
care about, or if you can make it something they care about, this may
change.
The job of those who campaign for privacy online, therefore, seems to
be to make privacy-enhancing be seen as a core value or as a feature, and
not as a bug or an optional, after the fact, bolt-on extra. For the coders
themselves, privacy, like security, is still most seen as something that gets
in the way of business and is an overhead rather than something that makes
money. Privacy gets in the way of money making activities like collecting
data about users, which can be sold and used in targeting ads. Similarly,
privacy regulation, such as the EU DP regime, is seen by most commercial
concerns as yet more red tape and costly bureaucracy, rather than as some-
thing that helps companies produce a more appealing product. It is hardly
surprising that DP is so often observed in the letter rather than in the sub-
stance and that despite seemingly tough privacy regulation, there have been
so many data breach scandals in the UK lately."
44. See EDWARDS, supra note 9, at ch. 14.
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Cory Doctorow has, however, suggested a different approach.45 In the
digital marketplace, it is often hard for one product to stand out. One MP3
download, for example, is much like another. He suggests that privacy
might be sold as a key benefit of a product, something of interest to the
public and enabling price discrimination. In a similar fashion, after public
pressure, sites like iTunes have begun offering DRM-free MP3s at a pre-
mium cost. This is very much how I have suggested above that Live Jour-
nal gained a market niche. If you are a phone company, suggests Doctorow,
you can gain customers by choosing to not keep customer activity logs
indefinitely. If you are a search company, you can delete your cookies 46
and tell your customers about this practice. Once your customers get wind
of the fact that the privacy they hoped for is for sale, and not unreasonably
expensive, these entities may find a profitable niche.
This is the hopeful idea of "privacy as brand," though so far a rather
optimistic one. Sadly, evidence to date seems to show that privacy has not
yet become an obvious selling point in the mainstream. Indeed, in one
study, researchers found a correlation between social network services
which made a point of their privacy features in their publicity, and these
sites performing poorly in the market.47 However, much of this may be a
result of the public lacking either the data or the skills necessary to discri-
minate on grounds of privacy. As data privacy scandals have rocked the
UK and the U.S. in the last few years, it is quite possible the public will
begin to be incentivized to acquire these skills and demand such data, thus
creating a market for privacy.
My final point is that in relation to privacy and code, technology de-
faults are crucial. Facebook is a good example of this. Facebook often as-
serts that it provides a huge variety of privacy enhancing tools to its
customers and this is in fact true. But in general, the defaults of the site are
set so that the user is encouraged to disclose the maximum data, and keep
the least amount of control. For example, it is not inconceivable that pro-
files could be set to be readable by "friends only" until the user chooses to
change the setting to "public." Likewise a new user could be forced to
work through a brief "set-up" routine before starting to use the site, akin to
an "install" routine, in which they could be encouraged to decide how to set
45. See Cory Doctrow, Ethics Are the New Craft, 1 SCRIPTED 514 (2004), available at
http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/ahrc/SCRIPT-ed/issue4/cory-ed.pdf.
46. ZDNet, Cookie: Definition, http://dictionary.zdnet.com/definition/Cookie.html (last visited
Dec. 27 2009).
47. See Joseph Bonneau, How Privacy Fails: The Facebook Applications Debacle,




their privacy controls in an understandable way to their own satisfaction.
Privacy controls on Facebook are currently hard to find, are not changeable
in a consistent way, and so are hard to master.These privacy controls be-
come more difficult in each new iteration of the Facebook desktop.
The reason for this is simple: Facebook makes its money not from
user subscriptions but from selling user data to marketers. More privacy
means less available data, and subsequently less money available for Face-
book to make by selling that data. Accordingly, by market failure, it is
possible that defaults may have to become the subject of regulation, 48 al-
though this takes us into the difficult terrain of "technology mandates."
Nonetheless, in the EU at least, there is considerable regulatory concern
about this matter, especially in relation to young and vulnerable people
who are the predominant users of social networking sites.
Controversially, this writer, who was raised working in the European
regulatory tradition, does believe that we need law to intervene here. We
need scrutiny of code in socially sensitive applications, especially in the
form of technology defaults, if we are to ensure that democratic and priva-
cy values are built integrally into the next generation of code, despite the
fact that market pressures will often-if not always-push towards unfet-
tered disclosure. How this scrutiny and regulation should be achieved is a
major challenge for the future. One interesting development is that in Eu-
rope, the long established Data Protection Directive is finally coming up
for review, and Viviane Reding, the Commissioner in charge, has given an
early indication 49 that she is in favour of regulation to support "privacy by
design." If this survives market onslaught to find its way into the new Di-
rective, it will be a radical victory for those who wish to see more delibe-
rate creation of privacy-enhancing code in mainstream applications. This
interesting space should be watched by the EU and U.S. alike, especially
considering that an initial draft of reforms is expected by end 2010.
48. See Lilian Edwards & Ian Brown, Data Control and Social Networking: Irreconcilable
Ideas?, in HARBORING DATA: INFORMATION SECURITY, LAW AND THE CORPORATION (Matwyshyn, A.
ed., 2009) available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1 148732.
49. Press Release, Viviane Reding Vice-President of the European Commission Responsible for
Justice, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship Next Steps for Justice, Fundamental Rights and Citizen-
ship in the EU European Policy Centre Briefing, Brussels (Mar. 18, 2010), available at
http://europa.eulrapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/1 0/108.
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